

things withouteforth, and medleth the
images of things withouteforth to tho
formes yhidde withinne himself.

prose V.
in corporibus sentiendis.

What yif that in
bodies to ben feled,
that is to seyn, in the
takinge of knowe-
leche of bodily
things, and albeit
so that the quali-
ties of bodies, that
ben objecte fro with
oute forth, moever
& contenten the instruments of the wittes,
and albeit so that the passion of the body,
that is to seyn, the wit or the suffraunce,
goth to form the strengthe of the workinge
coage, the which passion or suffraunce
clepeth forth the dede of the thocht in
himself, and moeveth and exciteth in this
mene while the formes that resten with-
inne forth; and yif that, in sensible bodies,
as I have seyd, our courage nis nat ytaught
or empreint by passion to knowe these
things, but demeth and knoweth, of his
owne strengthe, the passion or suffraunce
subject to the body: moche more thanne
the things that ben absolut and quite fro
alle talents or affections of bodies, as God
or his angesles, ne folwen nat in discern-
ing things object fro withoute forth, but
they accomplisshen and speden the dede
of hir thocht. By this resoun thanne ther
comen many maner knowinges to dyverse
and differinge substaunces. for the wit of
the body, the whiche wit is naked and de-
spoyled of alle other knowinges, thilke wit
cometh to beestes that ne mowen nat moev-
en himself her and ther, as oysters and
muscles, and other swiche shellefish of
the see, that clyven and ben norisshed to
roches. But the imaginacion cometh to
remuable beestes, that semen to han talent
to flicen or to desieren any thing. But resoun
is alonly to the linage of mankinde, right
as intelligencie is only to the devyne nature:
of which it folweth, that thilke knowinge
is more worth than thise othere, sin it know-
eth by his propre nature nat only his sub-
ject, as who seith, if ne knoweth nat alonly
that apertieneth properly to his knowinge,
but it knoweth the subjects of alle other
knowinges. But how shal it thanne be, yif
that wit and imaginacion stryven ayein
resouning, & seyn, that of thilke universel
thing that resoun weneth to seen, that it
nis right naught? for wit & imaginacion
seyn that that, that is sensible or imagin-
able, it ne may nat be universel. Thanne is
either the jugement of resoun sooth, ne
that ther nis nothing sensible; or elles, for

that resoun wot wel that many thinges ben
subject to wit and to imaginacioun, thanne
is the concepcioun of resoun veyn & false,
which that loketh & comprehendeth that
that is sensible and singular as uniuersel.
And yif that resoun wolde answeren ayein
to thise two, that is to seyn, to witte &
to imaginacioun, and seyn, that soothly she
herself, that is to seyn, resoun, loketh and
comprehendeth, by resoun of uniuersalitee,
bothe that that is sensible & that that
is imaginable; and that thilke two, that is
to seyn, wit and imaginacioun, ne mowen
nat strecchen ne enhansen herself to the
knowinge of uniuersalitee, for that the
knowinge of hem ne may exceden ne sur-
mounte the bodily figures: certes, of the
knowinge of thinges, men oughten rather
yeven credence to the more stedefast and
to the more parfit judgement. In this maner
stryvinge thanne, we that han strengthe
of resoninge & of imagininge and of wit,
that is to seyn, by resoun and by imagina-
cioun and by wit, we sholde rather preye
the cause of resoun; as who seith, than
the cause of wit and of imaginacioun.

EMBLABLE thing is it, that the resoun of mankindeneweneth nat that the devyne intelligence biholdeth or knoweth thinges to comen, but right as the resoun of mankinden knoweth hem. for thou arguest and seyst thus: that yif it ne seme nat to men that some thinges han certain & necessarie bitydinges, they ne mowen nat ben wist bi fore certainly to bityden. And thannen is ther no prescience of thilke thinges; and yif we trowe that prescience be in these thinges, thanne is ther nothing that it ne bitydeth by necessite. But certes, yif we mighten han the judgement of the devyne thought, as we ben parsoneres of resoun, right so as we han demed that it behoveth that imaginacioun and wit be binethe resoun, right so wolde we demen that it were rightful thing, that mannes resoun oughte to submitten itself and to ben binethe the divyne thought. for which, yif that we mowen, as who seith, that, yif that we mowen, I counseyle, that we enhanse us into the heighte of thilke sovereyn intelligence; for ther shal resoun wel seen that, that it ne may nat biholden in itself. And certes that is this, in what maner the prescience of God seeth alle thinges certein and diffinissed, although they ne han no certein issues or bitydinges; ne this is non opinioun, but it is rather the simplicitie of the sovereyn science, that nis nat enclosed nor yshet within none boundes.